Of the Indissolubility of Christian Marriage, and the Error of Those Who Maintain That Adultery Dissolves the Marriage Bond

A Defense of the Teachings of Jesus Against the Teachings of Mark Bullen Concerning Divorce, Remarriage, and the Law of Moses

Of the Indissolubility of Christian Marriage, and the Error of Those Who Maintain That Adultery Dissolves the Marriage Bond
"What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." — Matthew 19:6

Index

I. Concerning the Nature of the Present Controversy
II. That Marriage, Being Instituted by God, Possesses a Bond Which Does Not Depend Upon the Continued Fidelity of the Parties
III. Whether the Mosaic Permission for Divorce Can Be Regarded as a Perpetual Rule of Christian Morality
IV. Of the Exception Mentioned by St. Matthew, and Why It Does Not Establish the Dissolution of the Bond
V. That the Teaching of St. Paul Confirms the Permanence of Marriage Rather Than a General Liberty of Remarriage
VI. Whether a Second Marriage, Contracted Through Adultery, Can Afterwards Become a Lawful and Binding Union
VII. Of Polygamy, and Why the Practices of the Patriarchs Cannot Establish the Lawfulness of Plural Marriage Among Christians
VIII. Concerning the Excellence of Consecrated Virginity, and the Mistake of Supposing That Its Superiority Dishonors Marriage
IX. Whether the Catholic Doctrine of Indissolubility Was Invented in the Middle Ages
X. Of the Judgment of the Church, and the Correspondence of These Errors With the Condemnations of the Council of Trent
Conclusion: That the Perpetuity of Marriage Is Preserved by the Authority of Christ

I. Concerning the Nature of the Present Controversy

Among the many controversies which have arisen concerning the Christian religion, there are few in which the authority of private interpretation has produced consequences more injurious to the order established by Almighty God than in the question of the indissolubility of marriage. For although nearly all who profess the Christian name acknowledge marriage to be a divine institution, and willingly confess that it was established in the beginning by the Creator Himself, there remains a considerable disagreement concerning the nature and perpetuity of that sacred union, particularly whether the infidelity of one spouse may so destroy the matrimonial covenant that the innocent party becomes free to contract another marriage during the lifetime of the first. Yet this question cannot be regarded as a matter of ecclesiastical discipline alone, nor as a controversy concerning the prudence with which certain unfortunate domestic circumstances ought to be governed; for its resolution touches upon the very institution of marriage, the authority of Christ as the supreme Lawgiver of the New Covenant, and the obligation incumbent upon Christians to receive the doctrine which He delivered to His Apostles and which His Church has faithfully preserved.

In his writings entitled What the Bible Really Teaches About Divorce and Remarriage and Did Jesus Correct Moses? Expanded, Mark Bullen endeavors to establish that the dissolution of marriage, followed by a subsequent marriage, may under certain circumstances be not only permissible but altogether agreeable to the will of God. His principal argument proceeds from the Mosaic permission contained in Deuteronomy 24, which he regards as a righteous provision of divine legislation, established for the protection of the innocent and the orderly government of society. From this foundation he reasons that Christ, being the same divine Lawgiver who inspired Moses, could not have condemned a practice which had formerly been authorized by His own wisdom, and that the apparent severity of Our Lord's teaching concerning divorce must consequently be understood as a correction of the Jews' abuse of the Mosaic permission, rather than as the restoration of a more perfect and indissoluble union. Thus he maintains that the exception concerning fornication, mentioned by Christ in St. Matthew's Gospel, preserves the liberty of the innocent spouse to divorce and marry again, while the subsequent teaching of St. Paul must be interpreted in accordance with that same supposed liberty.

Nor does Bullen's doctrine end with the assertion that adultery may dissolve the first marriage, for he advances the further proposition that a second union, although contracted through an unlawful divorce and therefore adulterous in its commencement, may nevertheless establish a new and enduring matrimonial obligation. Having once been contracted, this second marriage is, according to his reasoning, no longer to be regarded as an adulterous relationship, since the adultery consisted principally in the former act of covenant-breaking, and not in the continued union of the parties who afterward became husband and wife. From this he concludes that persons who approach the Christian Church already living in such marriages ought not ordinarily to be required to relinquish them, but should rather repent of the original wrongdoing and continue faithfully in their present domestic condition. The same general principles also inform his treatment of polygamous converts and his opposition to the traditional Catholic preference for consecrated virginity over the married state.

Now it would be neither just nor profitable to consider these assertions as though they were altogether unrelated, since their mutual dependence supplies the key to the author's theological system. He is not merely disputing whether an innocent person may separate from an adulterous spouse, a liberty which Catholic doctrine itself recognizes; rather, he attributes to the commission of certain sins, and afterward to the formation of a new matrimonial union, the power of extinguishing obligations which the Church teaches to remain in force. It is therefore necessary to examine not only the particular scriptural passages upon which he relies, but also the more general principles by which he interprets them; for an error in the understanding of the Old Law will naturally produce an error concerning the New, while an erroneous conception of the matrimonial covenant will necessarily disturb the interpretation of those passages in which Our Lord and His Apostles speak of its perpetuity.

II. That Marriage, Being Instituted by God, Possesses a Bond Which Does Not Depend Upon the Continued Fidelity of the Parties

We must begin where Our Lord Himself began, namely with the institution of marriage in Paradise, before the fall of our first parents and before those disorders of human society which afterward occasioned so many exceptional provisions in the Mosaic legislation. For when the Pharisees approached Christ, asking whether a man might lawfully put away his wife for every cause, He did not first refer them to the judicial ordinances of Israel, nor did He proceed immediately to distinguish the several offenses which might justify a husband's repudiation of his wife. Instead, He recalled them to that first institution by which God created man and woman and ordained that the two should become one flesh; and having established this divine foundation, He declared that those whom God had joined together ought not to be separated by man. It is of great importance to observe the order of His reasoning, for He proceeds from the institution to the obligation, and from the authority of the Creator to the permanence of the union, thereby teaching that the binding force of marriage is not derived solely from the continuing good pleasure of the spouses, nor from any human tribunal competent to release them from their promises.

Bullen rightly observes that marriage is a covenant of companionship, and that the mutual assistance of husband and wife belongs to the divine purpose for which woman was given to man. Yet in describing marriage as ultimately a covenant of companionship, he appears to make that companionship so fundamental to the nature of the union that its grave violation may be regarded as destroying the covenant itself. This reasoning, though possessing a certain appearance of equity, fails to distinguish between the obligations arising from a relation and the existence of the relation from which those obligations proceed. For a man may violate the duties of fatherhood without thereby ceasing to be a father, and a Christian may grievously offend against the obligations of his baptism without thereby losing the sacramental character imprinted upon his soul. In like manner, the violation of matrimonial fidelity does not of itself establish that the matrimonial bond has ceased to exist; rather, the gravity of the offense presupposes the continued dignity and obligation of that very union against which the offense has been committed.

This distinction is beautifully illuminated by St. Augustine, who, in his writings concerning marriage, identifies three principal goods of the matrimonial state: offspring, fidelity, and the sacramental bond. The first regards the generation and Christian education of children; the second concerns the mutual faithfulness which husband and wife owe to one another; while the third signifies that enduring relation which, among Christians, possesses a sacred character reflecting the union of Christ with His Church. These goods are intimately connected, yet they are not so confused that the violation of one necessarily destroys the others. A marriage may remain truly matrimonial when children are not granted to the spouses, and likewise its bond may continue when fidelity has been grievously violated. Indeed, in On Marriage and Concupiscence, Book I, chapter 11, Augustine expressly argues that spouses who have separated remain bound by their former marriage, since otherwise the subsequent union of either party could not properly be described as adultery. In chapter 19 he further explains that the sacramental bond is not lost through either divorce or adultery, thereby excluding the very principle upon which Bullen's principal argument depends.

St. Thomas Aquinas, following this patristic tradition, treats the indissolubility of marriage not as an arbitrary burden imposed upon unfortunate spouses, but as a perfection proportioned to its nature and ends. For marriage, being ordained to the generation and education of children, requires a stability corresponding to the long and difficult duties of parenthood; and being likewise ordered to the faithful companionship of the spouses, it cannot fittingly be reduced to an association which either may dissolve whenever the other has failed in the performance of his obligations. But Christian marriage possesses a still higher dignity, inasmuch as it is a sacramental sign of the inseparable union of Christ and His Church, according to the teaching of the Apostle in Ephesians 5. Therefore, while mutual fidelity is most necessary to the proper exercise of marital life, the permanence of the bond rests upon a foundation more profound than the continued performance of every reciprocal duty.

We must consequently reject the inference that because adultery constitutes a grave violation of the marriage covenant, it follows that the adulterous party has thereby dissolved the marriage itself. Such an inference would confer upon the sinner a power which the divine institution does not grant, and would make the perpetuity of marriage depend ultimately upon the misconduct of those who ought to preserve it. Nor is the difficulty removed by attributing the power of dissolution to the innocent spouse, since the question remains whether God has bestowed upon either party the authority to terminate the bond through private judgment. To suffer injustice is one thing; to acquire jurisdiction over a divine institution is another. The Church acknowledges the first with compassion, while denying the second in fidelity to Christ.

III. Whether the Mosaic Permission for Divorce Can Be Regarded as a Perpetual Rule of Christian Morality

The principal strength of Bullen's argument, at least in the estimation of those who approach the controversy without the distinctions supplied by Catholic theology, arises from his appeal to the unchangeability of God. He reasons that if the bill of divorce prescribed by Moses was authorized by divine wisdom, then the same action cannot afterward be regarded as adulterous without implying a change in the divine judgment. In the preface to What the Bible Really Teaches About Divorce and Remarriage, he declares that the Mosaic law always prescribes what is best under the circumstances which it addresses; and elsewhere he argues that Christ's exception concerning fornication must possess the same moral meaning as the Mosaic permission, since to maintain otherwise would be to suppose that Christ had changed His mind. This reasoning is presented with considerable confidence, and is extended in Resist Not Evil???, where the author maintains that an action permitted as the proper remedy under one covenant cannot afterward become adultery under another covenant established by the same God.

Yet here we must carefully distinguish what the argument has improperly united, namely the immutability of the divine nature and the perpetuity of every positive ordinance established by divine authority. That God cannot change in His wisdom, justice, or goodness is an unquestionable doctrine of the Christian faith; but it does not follow that every law established for the government of a particular people, under particular historical circumstances, must remain perpetually binding upon mankind. The distinction is evident from the whole economy of the Old and New Testaments, since the ceremonies, sacrifices, and judicial ordinances prescribed to Israel were truly authorized by God, and yet were not therefore destined to continue without alteration under the Gospel. The divine wisdom does not become mutable because it ordains different provisions for different conditions, any more than a wise physician becomes inconsistent when he prescribes one remedy during the progress of an illness and another after the patient has recovered. What remains unchanged is the wisdom directing the remedy; what varies is the provision judged suitable to the condition of those who receive it.

Nor is this distinction merely an expedient invented to escape the force of the Mosaic legislation, for Our Lord Himself expressly makes it when He declares that Moses permitted divorce because of the hardness of the people's hearts, and then adds that from the beginning it was not so. The force of these words cannot be sufficiently considered. Christ does not deny that Moses permitted the practice, neither does He accuse the ancient Lawgiver of having acted without divine authority; but He distinguishes the permission from the original institution, and assigns to the former a cause which manifestly belongs to the imperfection of fallen mankind. If the Mosaic provision were simply the perpetual expression of the most perfect matrimonial order, why should Christ refer its existence to hardness of heart, or oppose to it the institution which prevailed from the beginning? And if He intended merely to suppress an excessive application of the divorce law, while preserving its fundamental permission unchanged, why did He answer the Pharisees by directing their attention away from the Mosaic concession and toward the original union established by the Creator?

St. Thomas considers this very difficulty in the Supplement to the Summa Theologiae, Question 67, where he discusses whether the bill of divorce was lawful under the Mosaic law and whether a divorced woman might afterward marry another. The Angelic Doctor reports more than one theological explanation of the ancient permission, distinguishing those who regarded it as a toleration of a disorder from those who understood it as involving a true divine dispensation. We need not determine every disputed circumstance of the ancient legislation in order to perceive the principle common to the discussion: the existence of a permission under the Old Law does not prove that its provisions remain applicable after Christ has recalled the ancient concession. Indeed, Aquinas expressly recognizes that the evangelical law restores the higher order of matrimonial obligation, and that a conclusion concerning the Old Testament dispensation cannot simply be transferred to the Christian sacrament without regard to the authority of the Redeemer.

There is therefore no necessity of choosing between fidelity to Moses and obedience to Christ, as though the Catholic doctrine could be maintained only by accusing the ancient Lawgiver of error. Moses was a faithful servant in the house of God, but Christ is the Son over His own house; and the servant's administration of a temporary concession cannot be placed against the Son's authoritative restoration of the divine institution. When Bullen insists that the Christian prohibition would imply a change in God's moral character, he mistakes the withdrawal of a concession for the alteration of an eternal truth, and thereby places upon the words of Moses a meaning which the Lord Himself refuses to grant them.

IV. Of the Exception Mentioned by St. Matthew, and Why It Does Not Establish the Dissolution of the Bond

We come now to the passage which Bullen regards as furnishing the most immediate proof of his doctrine, namely the exception concerning fornication contained in Matthew 19:9. He maintains that the exception necessarily extends to both divorce and remarriage, and that any interpretation which allows separation while forbidding a subsequent marriage does violence to the grammatical structure of Our Lord's words. The author further argues that the Greek term porneia designates sexual immorality sufficiently grave to destroy the matrimonial covenant, while the disciples' astonishment following Christ's discourse is explained by the severity with which He restricts the grounds of divorce, rather than by any new prohibition against remarriage. These considerations, taken together, form an argument of some complexity, and ought therefore to receive a more careful answer than the simple assertion that the Catholic interpretation differs from his own.

In the first place, we must observe that the meaning of a particular clause cannot rightly be established in such a manner as to render the other declarations of the same divine Teacher unintelligible. St. Mark, recounting the controversy concerning divorce, records Our Lord's declaration that the man who puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery against her, and likewise that a woman who abandons her husband and marries another commits adultery. St. Luke delivers the same substantial prohibition, while St. Paul expressly commands separated spouses to remain unmarried or be reconciled. It would consequently be an unsafe manner of interpreting Scripture to insist that the disputed exception in Matthew must authorize remarriage, while treating the unqualified prohibitions elsewhere as though they were necessarily subject to an exception which they do not express. The Church, receiving the several evangelical witnesses as parts of one divine revelation, seeks their harmonious meaning rather than allowing an interpretation of one passage to overthrow the evident doctrinal force of the others.

Nor does the grammatical argument possess the irresistible force which Bullen attributes to it. The scope and construction of the exception clause have been subjects of considerable exegetical discussion, and grammar alone does not determine whether the exception supplies a justification for separation, a qualification concerning the kind of union under consideration, or a general permission encompassing a subsequent marriage. The Catholic conclusion must therefore rest upon the whole testimony of Scripture, the distinction between separation and dissolution, and the authentic teaching of the Church, rather than upon a claim that the disputed wording admits of no syntactical difficulty. Yet when these considerations are brought together, the doctrine becomes clear: an offense may justify the cessation of conjugal life without conferring upon either spouse the liberty to contract a new marriage while the former bond endures.

St. Augustine, in his exposition of the Sermon on the Mount, expressly considers the exception concerning fornication and reconciles it with the Apostle's command that separated spouses remain unmarried or return to one another. He does not infer that the commission of adultery transforms the injured spouse into an unmarried person, but rather distinguishes the just cause of separation from the continuing obligation of matrimonial fidelity. This distinction possesses an admirable consistency, for it permits the innocent spouse to withdraw from an intolerable or gravely injurious union without treating the guilty spouse's offense as a means of destroying the marriage established before God. It likewise preserves the force of Our Lord's description of subsequent unions as adulterous, since adultery is intelligible precisely because an earlier marital obligation remains in force.

We should also consider the response of the disciples, who, having heard their Master's teaching, declare that if such is the condition of a man with his wife, it is not expedient to marry. Bullen understands their surprise as arising principally from the restriction of divorce to a sufficiently serious offense, but the narrative admits a stronger interpretation. If Our Lord had merely confirmed that divorce and remarriage remained lawful after sexual immorality, while forbidding the indiscriminate repudiation of wives for trifling causes, the disciples would indeed have heard a severe correction of prevalent abuses; yet the magnitude of their response is especially intelligible if they perceived that marriage imposed an obligation from which ordinary human expedients could not release them. Christ does not dispel their astonishment by granting a broader liberty of dissolution; rather, He proceeds to speak of continence and of those who renounce marriage for the kingdom of heaven, thereby raising their minds from the inconveniences of earthly obligation to the supernatural order of evangelical perfection.

The distinction between separating from an adulterous spouse and contracting another marriage is therefore neither unreasonable nor contrary to the Gospel. It is, rather, the very distinction required if we are to preserve at once the justice due to the innocent, the sanctity of the matrimonial bond, and the authority of Him who declared that man must not put asunder what God has joined together.

V. That the Teaching of St. Paul Confirms the Permanence of Marriage Rather Than a General Liberty of Remarriage

Finding that the evangelical accounts present considerable difficulty for his position, Bullen turns also to the Epistles of St. Paul, especially Romans 7 and 1 Corinthians 7, which he interprets according to his conception of the Mosaic law. He contends that when the Apostle declares a married woman bound by law so long as her husband lives, that statement must be understood with reference to the same law which, according to Bullen, permitted divorce and remarriage. Consequently, a woman whose marriage has been lawfully dissolved must be considered no longer bound, and in certain circumstances may even be regarded as occupying a condition equivalent to widowhood. But such reasoning does not resolve the Apostle's teaching; it assumes beforehand the dissolution which the Apostle's language naturally places in question. For St. Paul presents the death of the husband as the event by which the wife becomes free from the law binding her to him, and employs this familiar matrimonial principle as an illustration of a larger spiritual truth. To introduce into the passage an extensive theory of dissolution by adultery, apostasy, or subsequent remarriage is not to interpret the Apostle's expressed argument so much as to make it dependent upon a conclusion established elsewhere.

Still more decisive is the Apostle's instruction in 1 Corinthians 7:10–11, where he expressly distinguishes the act of separation from the liberty to contract another union. He commands that a wife should not depart from her husband; but if she departs, she is to remain unmarried or be reconciled, while the husband is likewise forbidden to put away his wife. We ought to consider that St. Paul does not present this instruction merely as a counsel of prudence adapted to persons possessing a special gift of continence, but attributes it to the command of the Lord. The significance of the distinction is considerable, since a counsel proposes a more excellent manner of life which one may freely embrace, whereas a divine precept imposes an obligation which cannot be set aside because its observance entails difficulty. The innocent spouse who cannot safely continue common life may have a just cause for separation; nevertheless, the resulting obligation to remain unmarried, where the bond endures, is not thereby transformed into an optional evangelical counsel.

Bullen further appeals to the Apostle's declaration that the Christian deserted by an unbelieving spouse is not under bondage, and from this he draws a general argument for dissolution in cases involving apostasy, fornication, or the abandonment of reconciliation. Catholic theology does indeed acknowledge a particular dissolution of a marriage originally contracted between two unbaptized persons, when one receives baptism and the other departs under the conditions prescribed by ecclesiastical law. This is commonly called the Pauline privilege, and its recognition demonstrates that the Church has never maintained an indiscriminate proposition that every matrimonial bond, without any distinction whatsoever, is incapable of dissolution under every conceivable circumstance. Yet the exception is carefully determined, and cannot be expanded at private discretion into a general permission for baptized Christians to dissolve a ratified and consummated sacramental marriage through the infidelity or apostasy of a spouse.

It is precisely this failure to distinguish the several kinds and conditions of matrimonial bonds which produces much confusion in Bullen's treatment of the subject. The indissolubility belonging to a ratified and consummated sacramental marriage must not be confounded with the more limited questions concerning unions that lack sacramental consummation or that fall within an authentic privilege recognized by the Church. The latter cases possess their own theological and juridical conditions, none of which can be reduced simply to the opinion of one party that the marriage covenant has been sufficiently violated. Nor is it legitimate to infer from the Apostle's instruction that persons should ordinarily remain in the condition in which they were called that a convert must continue every relationship which may have existed before conversion. St. Paul is not commanding a Christian to persist in an objectively unlawful condition, but teaching that the reception of the Gospel does not of itself require the abandonment of a legitimate state of life.

We must consequently inquire, in every disputed case, whether a true marriage was originally contracted, whether the bond still subsists, and whether the law of God permits its dissolution in the circumstances alleged. Only when those questions have been answered can one determine whether a subsequent union is valid. The mere existence of a civil marriage, the sincerity of those involved, or the impossibility of restoring former domestic relations cannot independently establish that a previous bond has ceased to exist. Thus the Catholic doctrine is neither a reckless prohibition of every second marriage nor a denial of the difficult circumstances in which converts may find themselves; it is an insistence that the lawfulness of the second union depends upon the truth concerning the first.

VI. Whether a Second Marriage, Contracted Through Adultery, Can Afterwards Become a Lawful and Binding Union

It is here that Bullen's system reveals its most serious internal difficulty, for after maintaining that adultery may dissolve an existing marriage, he advances the further proposition that even a second marriage contracted unlawfully may become a binding union which ought not afterward to be broken. In What the Bible Really Teaches About Divorce and Remarriage, he argues that the adultery consists in the original act of breaking wedlock and contracting another marriage, rather than in the continued condition of those who have entered the second union. He accordingly maintains that the first obligation to reconcile may be destroyed by the second marriage, which then becomes binding according to the same principles that governed the first. His explanation of the Greek present indicative is employed to support this contention, since he denies that the expression translated as committing adultery necessarily signifies an uninterrupted series of adulterous acts.

Now we may readily grant that the grammatical form of a verb, considered in isolation, does not settle every question concerning the duration of an action or the moral character of a continuing relationship. It would be an unwise argument to maintain that because a particular verb appears in the present tense, every moment of an irregular union must therefore constitute a distinct and equally culpable act of adultery. Catholic moral theology has never required such a simplistic manner of reasoning. It carefully distinguishes an objective state of affairs, the individual acts performed within that state, and the knowledge, consent, and responsibility of the persons concerned. Nevertheless, this concession affords no support to Bullen's principal conclusion, for the decisive question is not whether the Greek verb necessarily describes continuous activity, but whether a valid marriage can be contracted while one of the parties remains bound by an existing marriage. If that bond continues, then the persons are not free to establish the second matrimonial relation, whatever grammatical account may be given of the sin committed in attempting to do so.

Indeed, the contrary opinion involves a most remarkable inversion of moral order. For if the first marriage truly remains binding, the unlawful attempt to contract a second cannot reasonably be assigned the power of dissolving it; otherwise the violation of a divine obligation would itself become the means by which that obligation is extinguished. Such a principle would make wrongdoing capable of producing the very authority which the wrongdoer lacked before committing the offense. A man could not lawfully abandon his wife and marry another; yet, having attempted precisely this forbidden action, he would afterward be permitted to maintain that the second union has become binding and that the first has lost its claim upon him. Thus the forbidden act would possess a dissolving power denied to innocent conduct, and the law which originally prohibited the second union would finally be invoked to protect it.

Bullen attempts to resolve this difficulty through an appeal to Deuteronomy 24, according to which the former husband could not receive again the woman who had become the wife of another. But once more the ancient judicial provision must not be converted into a universal principle governing Christian marriage. Whatever precise juridical effects belonged to the Mosaic dispensation, the Christian matrimonial bond is to be judged according to the law restored by Christ. St. Thomas himself treats the ancient prohibition against returning to the former husband within the particular context of the Old Law, and distinguishes the questions of what was permitted, what was commanded, and what belonged to the original nature of marriage. The attempt to employ this Mosaic provision as proof that a second union must necessarily supersede the first therefore assumes what remains to be demonstrated.

This question has particular importance for the author's treatment of repentance and conversion. He argues that persons who have entered an unlawful second marriage should repent sincerely of the former wrongdoing, while continuing faithfully in the union which has since become their established family life. There is certainly a Christian truth in the insistence that repentant sinners must be received with charity, that their past sins do not place them beyond divine mercy, and that innocent children must not suffer neglect because of the moral errors of their parents. Yet none of these principles proves that a second union is valid when a previous matrimonial bond continues. Forgiveness removes the guilt of sin in the soul properly disposed to receive it; it does not, by its mere occurrence, change the objective conditions required for a valid marriage.

We must here be particularly careful lest the defense of the law become an occasion of cruelty toward those whose lives have been entangled in circumstances not easily remedied. The Catholic Church does not teach that children born within an irregular union are to be abandoned, nor that persons who have sincerely sought conversion must be treated without compassion. Rather, she requires that the true matrimonial status of the parties be established, that their obligations toward children and other dependents be faithfully discharged, and that their present manner of life be brought into conformity with the divine law. In certain cases a former marriage may be shown never to have been valid; in others a lawful dissolution may have occurred under conditions recognized by the Church; and in still others the prior bond may remain, requiring the parties to cease relations proper only to spouses, even where serious obligations of care continue. Such determinations cannot be made merely from the outward appearance of a household, and the Church's concern for their proper examination is not opposed to mercy, but belongs to the justice without which mercy itself is disordered.

VII. Of Polygamy, and Why the Practices of the Patriarchs Cannot Establish the Lawfulness of Plural Marriage Among Christians

The same fundamental confusion between ancient permission and permanent Christian obligation appears in Bullen's treatment of polygamy. Observing that several patriarchs possessed more than one wife, and that the Mosaic legislation contained provisions governing such households, he reasons that polygamy cannot be considered intrinsically equivalent to adultery. He further maintains that the apostolic churches accepted men already possessing multiple wives, although such men were not permitted to occupy positions of ecclesiastical leadership, and from this alleged practice he draws a rule for missionary work among peoples where polygamous unions are customary. He considers it contrary to Christian charity to require such converts to abandon their existing domestic arrangements, and regards the gradual restoration of monogamy as more agreeable to the manner in which God governs fallen mankind.

But here again we must distinguish the various questions which the argument has brought together. Whether God permitted certain patriarchs to possess several wives is one question; whether such arrangements conform to the original perfection of marriage is another; whether they may be lawfully contracted by Christians under the New Covenant is yet a third; while the pastoral treatment of those who enter the Church from societies in which such unions have existed raises further questions requiring the application of justice and prudence. It is therefore insufficient to prove that polygamy occurred among the patriarchs and then conclude that the same arrangements must be regarded as lawful Christian marriages. Neither can the mere fact that a man with several wives may have been received into Christian instruction establish, without additional historical evidence, that the Apostles recognized all his existing unions as valid and simultaneously binding Christian marriages.

St. Thomas treats the plurality of wives within the context of the divine dispensations of the Old Testament, observing that certain practices permitted to the patriarchs cannot simply be transferred to the Christian law. The Council of Trent, in Session XXIV, Canon 2, expressly condemns the assertion that Christians may lawfully possess several wives at the same time. The Catholic doctrine therefore rests upon the unity of marriage as instituted in the beginning and restored by Christ, not upon a supposition that every ancient household arrangement was equally suited to the perfection of the Gospel. Nor should the prudential obligations owed to women and children within polygamous societies be confused with an affirmation that all the unions in question possess the character of true and simultaneous Christian marriages. The duty to provide justice and material support does not necessarily establish the matrimonial validity of every relationship from which those duties have arisen.

There is also a significant difficulty within Bullen's own reasoning, since he acknowledges that the apostolic churches, as he understands them, did not ordinarily permit Christian men to acquire additional wives, and that monogamy was gradually restored among believers. If the plurality of wives were simply an enduring expression of divine moral wisdom applicable whenever circumstances appeared to warrant it, it is necessary to explain why the Christian community should have been directed toward its abandonment. The Catholic explanation is plain: certain practices tolerated or permitted in earlier periods did not express the full perfection of the original institution, and the New Covenant restored that institution to its proper unity. Thus the pastoral difficulties attending the conversion of polygamous households are real and demand prudence, but they cannot overturn the doctrinal principle by which those difficulties must be judged.

VIII. Concerning the Excellence of Consecrated Virginity, and the Mistake of Supposing That Its Superiority Dishonors Marriage

Although the greater part of Bullen's writings concerning marriage addresses divorce and remarriage, his rejection of the traditional Catholic preference for consecrated virginity reveals another important difference between his theological principles and those of the ancient Church. In a recorded presentation concerning the First Epistle to Timothy, he objects to the Catholic doctrine that virginity or celibacy consecrated to God is a better and more blessed state than marriage, regarding this preference as a form of false religious piety. Yet such an objection proceeds from a misunderstanding of the distinction between the goodness of a state of life and its relative excellence as a means of pursuing the evangelical counsels. The Church does not despise marriage by preferring consecrated virginity, any more than she despises the lawful possession of earthly goods by praising those who voluntarily renounce them for the kingdom of heaven.

Marriage is good, holy, and divinely instituted; and among the baptized it possesses the dignity of a sacrament, through which grace is conferred for the fulfillment of its proper duties. Nevertheless, St. Paul expressly teaches that the unmarried person may devote himself with a less divided heart to the things of the Lord, while the married person is obliged to attend also to the legitimate concerns of spouse and family. The Apostle does not thereby condemn these concerns, since their faithful discharge may become a means of great sanctification; but he recognizes that a person who freely renounces marriage for God's sake may be more entirely available for those exercises of charity and contemplation which belong to the evangelical counsels. The excellence of consecrated virginity therefore concerns its supernatural end and the freedom it affords for divine service, not the personal holiness of every individual who embraces it.

The Council of Trent, in Session XXIV, Canon 10, solemnly maintains that the state of virginity or celibacy is better and more blessed than matrimony. Pope Pius XII, in the encyclical Sacra virginitas of March 25, 1954, defends the same teaching with particular care, distinguishing the superiority of consecrated chastity from the false supposition that marriage is dishonorable or incapable of producing great sanctity. Indeed, the Church has raised married men and women to the honors of the altar, while also teaching that voluntary continence undertaken for the love of Christ constitutes a more excellent evangelical state. There is no contradiction in this, since the perfection of a state considered in itself must be distinguished from the actual charity and virtue possessed by the individual who lives within it.

Nor does the fact that not all persons receive the gift of perpetual continence establish that those whose marriage has been lawfully separated, while its bond continues, must necessarily possess a right to marry another. Bullen employs the difficulty of remaining unmarried as an argument against the Catholic doctrine of indissolubility, but the demands of the moral law cannot be measured solely by the natural ease with which they may be fulfilled. Christian chastity, whether required within marriage or outside it, depends upon the assistance of divine grace, the avoidance of occasions of sin, and the faithful exercise of virtue. The Church does not command every person to embrace consecrated virginity as a state of perfection, yet she does require every Christian to observe the chastity appropriate to his actual condition. A separated person whose valid marriage remains binding is not thereby called to consecrated virginity in the technical sense; nevertheless, the obligation to refrain from a new matrimonial union follows from the continuing bond and cannot be dissolved merely because the obligation is difficult.

IX. Whether the Catholic Doctrine of Indissolubility Was Invented in the Middle Ages

It remains to consider the historical accusation upon which Bullen relies in order to weaken the authority of Catholic teaching, namely that the absolute prohibition of divorce and remarriage became an official position of the Roman Church only around the tenth century, and that later scholastic authorities contributed to its propagation. This assertion is of no small consequence, for if it were true that the doctrine of indissolubility arose as a comparatively late innovation, one might reasonably ask whether the Catholic Church had departed from the practice of primitive Christianity. Yet an accusation of this character ought not to be accepted merely because it agrees with the prejudices of those who oppose Rome; it must be examined according to the testimony of antiquity, and particularly according to those Fathers whose writings long preceded the medieval controversies.

Here the witness of St. Augustine possesses extraordinary importance. Writing in the early fifth century, many hundreds of years before the period alleged by Bullen, Augustine expressly teaches that a husband and wife remain bound by marriage while both live, even if they have separated, and that the existence of the original matrimonial relation explains why a subsequent union constitutes adultery. In On Marriage and Concupiscence, Book I, chapter 11, he makes this argument with remarkable clarity, distinguishing the law of the world, which may allow divorce followed by another marriage, from the law of the Gospel, which preserves the continuing marital relation. He returns to the same principle in chapter 19, where he identifies the sacramental bond as a good of marriage which is not lost through adultery or divorce. Such testimony cannot reasonably be reconciled with the assertion that the doctrine first appeared as an official Catholic invention around the tenth century.

Nor does Augustine stand alone as though his teaching were an isolated speculation possessing no relation to the broader Christian tradition. His exposition of the Sermon on the Mount likewise interprets the evangelical exception in harmony with St. Paul's command that separated spouses remain unmarried or be reconciled. The early testimony of Pope St. Innocent I further deserves consideration in a fuller historical investigation, as do the writings and disciplinary traditions of other ancient Christian authorities. It must be admitted that the history of divorce and remarriage in the first Christian centuries contains disputed questions, especially concerning the interpretation of certain patristic passages and the disciplinary treatment of difficult matrimonial cases. But this fact cannot justify the sweeping claim that the Catholic doctrine had no substantial existence before the medieval period, since the explicit evidence of Augustine alone establishes its presence many centuries earlier.

We ought also to distinguish the historical appearance of a doctrine from the subsequent precision with which its implications are formulated. The Church has frequently been obliged to define more exactly what she had already received, especially when the rise of contrary opinions rendered necessary an authoritative distinction between truth and error. Such development does not imply that the doctrine originated at the moment of its definition, any more than the solemn definitions concerning the divinity of Christ imply that Christians first believed in His divinity when the ancient councils defended it against heresy. Thus the Council of Trent did not create the indissolubility of marriage by condemning the errors opposed to it; rather, it exercised the teaching authority of the Church in defense of a doctrine already established in Scripture and witnessed by the earlier tradition.

In this respect the historical argument advanced against Catholic marriage doctrine is particularly unsatisfactory, for it attempts to invalidate the Church's teaching by an alleged chronology which the surviving sources do not support. The proper inquiry is not whether every ancient writer employed precisely the terminology of Trent or St. Thomas, but whether the substance of the doctrine can be found in the earlier Christian witnesses. Since Augustine unmistakably affirms the continuing marriage bond after separation, the claim of a tenth-century origin is untenable in its broad form.

X. Of the Judgment of the Church, and the Correspondence of These Errors With the Condemnations of the Council of Trent

Having considered the principal arguments advanced by Bullen, we may now examine their relation to the solemn judgment of the Catholic Church. It is necessary to proceed with theological exactness, since not every opinion contrary to Catholic teaching is condemned under precisely the same theological note, nor does every resemblance between a modern assertion and an ancient condemnation establish an exact correspondence. Nevertheless, when the author's position is considered in its entirety, the fundamental conflict with the doctrine defended by the Council of Trent becomes exceedingly clear. Bullen does not merely maintain that innocent spouses may separate on account of adultery, nor does he confine himself to questions concerning invalid marriages or narrowly defined privileges. He teaches that a valid matrimonial covenant may be dissolved through sexual immorality, that the innocent spouse may afterward contract another marriage, and that the Church's contrary doctrine represents a departure from the teaching of Christ and the Apostles.

The importance of the last assertion should not be overlooked, for Session XXIV, Canon 7, of the Council of Trent is expressly directed against the claim that the Church has erred in teaching, according to the evangelical and apostolic doctrine, that the marriage bond cannot be dissolved because of adultery, and that even the innocent spouse cannot contract another marriage during the lifetime of the other. It is therefore not sufficient to read the canon as though it merely condemned every unfortunate person who has held a mistaken opinion concerning a particular matrimonial case. Its formal language concerns the alleged error of the Church herself. Yet Bullen's broader historical and doctrinal argument moves beyond the simple assertion that remarriage may sometimes be permissible, since he represents the Catholic prohibition as a later corruption and contends that the original apostolic doctrine authorized the very practice which the Church forbids. The cumulative evidence thus establishes a substantially stronger correspondence with the proposition condemned by Trent than would appear from considering only one isolated statement about divorce.

A similar distinction is necessary concerning the other matrimonial canons. Canon 5 rejects the dissolution of the marriage bond on account of heresy, burdensome cohabitation, or deliberate absence; Canon 2 condemns the claim that Christians may lawfully possess several wives simultaneously; and Canon 10 defends the superiority of virginity or celibacy over the married state. These definitions bear upon different portions of the author's teaching, although their application must be made according to the precise proposition asserted. His claim concerning the reception of polygamous converts, for example, involves historical and pastoral questions which should not be confused without qualification with a direct profession that Christians may freely contract additional marriages. Likewise, his insistence that repentant converts should be received with charity expresses a principle which is itself altogether Catholic, although his further conclusion concerning the validity of their subsequent unions may be erroneous. The strength of a theological refutation is not diminished by such distinctions; on the contrary, it is increased, because the Church's doctrine is thereby defended in its proper meaning rather than in a distorted or exaggerated form.

Pope Leo XIII, in Arcanum divinae sapientiae, and Pope Pius XI, in Casti connubii, reaffirm the traditional doctrine concerning the nature, unity, and indissolubility of marriage. Particularly worthy of attention is the teaching of Pius XI, who distinguishes with admirable clarity between the indissoluble bond and the separation of spouses in circumstances which render their common life gravely dangerous or intolerable. For the Church, being both mother and teacher, does not deny the misfortunes which may afflict marriage, nor does she require that the innocent should remain without protection against every form of injury. She acknowledges the necessity of prudent remedies, while refusing to confer upon human authority a power over the matrimonial bond which belongs neither to the spouses nor to the civil magistrate.

It is here that we perceive the fundamental difference between the two theological systems. Bullen begins with the supposed necessity of permitting a new marriage in order to remedy the injustice occasioned by the former; the Catholic Church begins with the divine institution of the existing bond, and then seeks every lawful remedy consistent with its preservation. The former makes the continuance of the marriage depend, under certain circumstances, upon the conduct of the parties; the latter recognizes that the parties are bound by an objective relation which their misconduct may violate but cannot, of itself, extinguish. Once this distinction is understood, the several controversies concerning Mosaic divorce, the evangelical exception, the Pauline instructions, and the validity of subsequent unions appear not as disconnected questions, but as consequences of one more profound disagreement concerning the authority of God over marriage.

Conclusion: That the Perpetuity of Marriage Is Preserved by the Authority of Christ

We have therefore found, after examining the principal arguments advanced by Bullen concerning divorce and remarriage, that the controversy ultimately concerns a question greater than the interpretation of any single passage of Scripture. It concerns whether the matrimonial bond, once validly established, remains subject to dissolution by the private judgment of those who have entered it, or whether it possesses a permanence deriving from the divine institution itself. Bullen endeavors to vindicate his doctrine by appealing to the Mosaic concession, the exception recorded by St. Matthew, the difficulties attending involuntary continence, and the supposed binding character of subsequent unions. Yet these arguments, when compared with the fuller testimony of Scripture and the ancient teaching of the Church, fail to establish the power of adultery to dissolve the Christian marriage bond.

The Mosaic permission cannot be regarded as a perpetual rule merely because it was established under divine authority, since Christ Himself distinguishes the concession granted on account of hardness of heart from the institution which prevailed from the beginning. The exception concerning fornication cannot be interpreted so as to overthrow the unqualified declarations of St. Mark and St. Luke, or the express command of St. Paul that separated spouses remain unmarried or be reconciled. Nor can a subsequent union, contracted while a valid and enduring marriage continues, acquire the power to extinguish that marriage simply because the parties have afterward undertaken to live faithfully within their new household. The existence of grave domestic difficulties, however deserving of sympathy and prudent assistance, does not confer upon human beings an authority which Almighty God has not granted.

Furthermore, the doctrine defended by the Catholic Church is not a medieval invention, as the explicit testimony of St. Augustine sufficiently demonstrates. It belongs to that ancient Christian understanding of matrimony which recognizes, beyond the natural goods of companionship and offspring, a sacred and enduring union reflecting the fidelity of Christ to His Church. This doctrine was explained by the Fathers, developed by the scholastic theologians, defended by the Council of Trent, and solemnly reaffirmed by the Roman Pontiffs long before the middle of the twentieth century. The continuity of this testimony deserves serious consideration from every Christian who professes to seek the teaching of the Apostles rather than the opinions of men.

We do not deny that the law of Christ may demand great sacrifices, nor that the sufferings occasioned by marital infidelity may be grievous beyond expression. But the Christian religion has never promised that fidelity to divine law would always be accompanied by earthly ease, nor has it taught that an obligation ceases to bind merely because its observance becomes painful. Rather, the Gospel raises human life above the calculations of temporary convenience and calls the faithful to a constancy corresponding to the divine charity from which every holy obligation receives its strength. The marriage bond is not made sacred because men have always preserved it faithfully, but because God has established it; and its dignity is not diminished when men sin against it, but is thereby shown to stand above their inconstancy.

Let us therefore receive with reverence the words of Our Lord, neither diminishing their force through the expedients of private interpretation nor supposing that His mercy is opposed to His justice. For He who restored marriage to its primitive dignity is the same Redeemer who offers grace sufficient for the fulfillment of His commandments, and who, in establishing the Church as the guardian of His doctrine, has not abandoned mankind to the uncertainties of innumerable conflicting opinions.

And if it should be asked by what authority the Church maintains that the matrimonial bond cannot be dissolved by adultery, her answer is not that she has devised a stricter discipline than that of Christ, but that she has faithfully received and preserved the law which He Himself proclaimed:

"What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder."


Theological and Historical Authorities

Sacred Scripture

Genesis 2:18–24; Deuteronomy 24:1–4; Matthew 5:31–32; Matthew 19:3–12; Mark 10:2–12; Luke 16:18; Romans 7:1–3; 1 Corinthians 7:10–17, 25–40; Ephesians 5:22–33.

The Fathers and Doctors of the Church

  • St. Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, Book I, chapters 11 and 19.
  • St. Augustine, On the Good of Marriage.
  • St. Augustine, On Adulterous Marriages.
  • St. Augustine, On the Sermon on the Mount, Book I, especially the exposition of Matthew 5:32.
  • St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, Questions 65–67.
  • St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I–II, Questions 98–108, concerning the Old Law and New Law.

The Councils and Roman Pontiffs

  • Council of Trent, Session XXIV, November 11, 1563, especially Canons 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10.
  • Roman Catechism, Part II, concerning the Sacrament of Matrimony.
  • Pope Leo XIII, Arcanum divinae sapientiae, February 10, 1880.
  • Pope Pius XI, Casti connubii, December 31, 1930, especially paragraphs 31–35 and 87–89.
  • Pope Pius XII, Sacra virginitas, March 25, 1954.

Primary Sources Under Examination

  • Mark Bullen, What the Bible Really Teaches About Divorce and Remarriage, especially printed pp. 5–6, 20–22, 30–37, 50–59, 67–76, 84–104, and 114–120.
  • Mark Q. Bullen, Did Jesus Correct Moses? Expanded, especially printed pp. 87–91 and 322–328.
  • Mark Q. Bullen, Resist Not Evil???, printed p. 83.
  • Mark Bullen, 1Tim 3:8 to 4:8 How Much Do We Care About Truth?, approximately 00:49:14–00:51:36.
  • Mark Bullen, Divorce & Remarriage: How Not To Test Positive For [Willful Ignorance], approximately 00:26:04–00:30:55.
  • Living Faith Christian Fellowship Website, sections concerning divorce, remarriage, and the reception of converts.