Of the True Nature of Christian Charity, and the Just Limits of Resistance to Evil

A Defense of the Ancient Catholic Doctrine Concerning Divine Love, Human Dignity, Fraternal Correction, and the Legitimate Use of Force, Against the Moral Theology of Mark Bullen

Of the True Nature of Christian Charity, and the Just Limits of Resistance to Evil
"Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good." — Romans 12:21

I. Concerning the Nature of Christian Charity, and the Danger of Confounding Zeal for Righteousness With the Perfection of Love

Among the virtues which Almighty God requires of those who profess His holy religion, there is none more excellent than charity, for it is by charity that man is united to God as his last end, and that the several duties which he owes to his neighbor are directed toward their supernatural perfection. Nevertheless, because charity is frequently mistaken for a mere disposition of natural affection, or for that agreeable indulgence by which men seek to avoid the displeasure of others, it has become necessary in every age to distinguish the true love commanded by Christ from those appearances of benevolence which, under the pretext of kindness, excuse wrongdoing and permit the sinner to remain undisturbed in his rebellion against God. Upon this distinction Mark Bullen lays considerable emphasis in his treatise Does Your Love Fulfill the Law?, wherein he endeavors to demonstrate that the divine commandments constitute the proper rule of Christian love, and that no man can rightly claim to exercise charity while deliberately approving what God has forbidden. Thus far his argument proceeds upon a principle which the Catholic Church herself has always maintained; for charity, being a theological virtue, cannot have for its object anything contrary to the divine goodness, nor can an act become virtuous merely because it proceeds from an affectionate disposition or is agreeable to those who receive it.

Yet there is a considerable difference between maintaining that charity must be governed by divine law and supposing that charity is sufficiently explained by the condemnation of those who transgress it. The former proposition expresses a necessary truth of Christian morality; the latter, when carried to its logical conclusion, tends to destroy the very distinction between justice and charity, and to make the sinner's unworthiness a reason for withholding those offices of mercy which the Gospel expressly commands. It is precisely here that Bullen's theological system begins to depart from the doctrine of the ancient Church. Having rightly perceived that an indulgent affection toward wrongdoing is not Christian love, he proceeds to describe the love owed to the unrepentant sinner in terms so restricted that warning, condemnation, and the announcement of divine judgment appear to exhaust its legitimate expression. The severity of this conclusion becomes especially evident when the several propositions contained in his treatise are considered together, for what might otherwise be explained as an excessive rhetorical expression is repeatedly affirmed as a general rule governing the Christian's relation to those who remain outside the author's conception of obedience to God.

In the section entitled Charity in Context, Bullen declares that violators of God's law are under judgment and that warning them of their condition constitutes the only love for which they are eligible. Elsewhere he maintains that Christians can show love, joy, and peace only toward those who seek God with a humble heart, while their duty toward the remaining multitude consists in calling them to repentance and warning them of hell. He further asserts that the Holy Spirit is angry rather than loving toward the ungodly rebel, and employs the example of an animal which forfeits its usefulness through rebellion in order to illustrate how mankind may destroy its own value in the eyes of God. These statements, are not merely accidental ornaments of his discourse; they reveal a recurring tendency to conceive divine love principally according to the worthiness of its recipient, and to regard the condemnation of evil as though it were sufficient to determine the entirety of the Christian's obligations toward the evildoer.

The difficulty is not that Bullen condemns sin too severely, but that he does not sufficiently distinguish the sin which deserves condemnation from the person who remains the proper object of charity. For the Catholic doctrine maintains both truths without diminishing either: that every deliberate offense against God is hateful because it is contrary to His goodness, and that the sinner, notwithstanding his offense, retains a human nature created by God, capable during this life of receiving divine grace, and consequently worthy of those acts of charity which the natural and evangelical laws prescribe. To separate these truths is to fall into one of two contrary errors, either that false compassion which excuses the sin for the sake of the sinner, or that false severity which withdraws compassion from the sinner because of the sin. The perfection of Christian morality consists in neither extreme, but in the harmonious exercise of those virtues which God Himself has joined together.

II. That Charity Does Not Approve Sin, Yet Neither Does the Sinner Cease to Be Its Proper Object

The distinction which Bullen's moral theology requires is supplied with remarkable precision by St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 25, Article 6, wherein the Angelic Doctor expressly asks whether sinners ought to be loved out of charity. It is worthy of particular attention that St. Thomas does not approach this question by dismissing the scriptural passages which speak of hatred toward the wicked, nor does he maintain that love obliges a Christian to disregard the moral condition of those with whom he associates. On the contrary, he acknowledges the authority of those passages and proceeds to reconcile them by distinguishing two things which may be considered in every sinner, namely his nature and his guilt. According to the nature which he has received from God, the sinner remains a man capable of happiness and, while he lives, of conversion to the divine friendship; but according to the guilt by which he opposes himself to God, he possesses something which must be hated precisely because it is contrary to the good which charity desires for him. Thus the same supernatural love which detests the sin obliges us to desire the sinner's deliverance from it.

This distinction is not a merely philosophical refinement introduced to moderate the severity of the Gospel, but follows from the very nature of the commandment to love one's neighbor. When Our Lord commands His disciples to love their enemies, to bless those who curse them, and to pray for those who persecute them, He does not suppose that these enemies are already obedient, humble, or favorably disposed toward God. Indeed, if their present righteousness were the condition of our obligation to love them, the commandment would lose the very character which distinguishes it from ordinary human affection. Christ Himself establishes the contrast when He observes that even sinners love those who love them, whereas His disciples must imitate the heavenly Father, who bestows the ordinary benefits of His providence upon the just and unjust. It is therefore impossible to make the unrepentant condition of a sinner the general reason for excluding him from Christian benevolence without introducing a qualification which the words of Christ do not contain.

Nor should we suppose that the obligation to love enemies consists solely in announcing the judgment which awaits them unless they repent. Such admonition may certainly be an act of charity, and in circumstances where a grave spiritual danger is present it may become an obligation of considerable seriousness; nevertheless, the same charity which seeks the conversion of the soul also obliges us, according to the conditions of prudence and justice, to relieve the bodily necessities of those who suffer. The Apostle expressly commands that if one's enemy is hungry he should be fed, and if he is thirsty he should be given drink (Romans 12:20), while Our Lord, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, presents the care bestowed upon a wounded stranger as the proper fulfillment of neighborly love. It would be a strange interpretation of these passages to maintain that the wounded man must first be found obedient to God's commandments before he becomes eligible to receive assistance, or that the Christian who encounters an enemy in bodily distress has discharged the whole obligation of charity by informing him of his peril of damnation.

St. Thomas develops this doctrine still further when, answering the objection that Christians ought not to associate with sinners, he distinguishes association in sin from association undertaken for the sinner's conversion. The former is forbidden because it involves cooperation in evil; the latter may be not only permissible but commendable, as is demonstrated by the example of Our Lord, who ate with publicans and sinners without approving their offenses. The Angelic Doctor also teaches that a sinner who has fallen from virtue should ordinarily be assisted in recovering it, provided there remains reasonable hope of amendment, and that the amenities of friendship ought not simply to be denied him on account of his wrongdoing. Prudence may indeed require distance from a dangerous person, and charity does not impose upon every Christian an indiscriminate familiarity with those whose company threatens his own salvation; yet such limitations concern the manner in which charity is exercised, and not the destruction of the sinner's title to be loved as a fellow creature destined by God to supernatural happiness.

We must therefore distinguish the general duty of willing another's true good from the particular expressions of affection, intimacy, trust, or approval which circumstances may render inappropriate. The Church does not command that the impenitent should be assured of salvation, nor that a rebellious person should be treated as though his rebellion were pleasing to God. She commands rather that his salvation should be sincerely desired, his conversion diligently sought, and his necessities relieved according to the obligations of Christian charity. Thus the warning of judgment and the offering of assistance are not mutually exclusive acts, since both may proceed from the same supernatural love. Bullen's error consists in presenting them as though the first exhausted the legitimate charity owed to the sinner, thereby diminishing the fullness of the evangelical commandment under the appearance of defending its severity.

III. Whether the Anger of God Toward Sin Is Contrary to His Love for the Sinner

A still more fundamental difficulty appears in Bullen's description of the divine disposition toward those who persist in wrongdoing. In his discussion of the fruits of the Holy Spirit, he maintains that within the realm of the ungodly rebel the Spirit of God is angry rather than loving, and appeals to the punishment of Ananias and Sapphira as evidence that divine holiness must sometimes be manifested through severe judgment. Now it is undoubtedly true that the Sacred Scriptures frequently speak of God's anger against sinners, and that His judgments are not mere figures of speech signifying nothing real. The destruction of the wicked, the punishment of sacrilege, and the everlasting separation of the obstinately impenitent from the enjoyment of God are realities which no faithful Catholic may deny. Yet it does not follow that divine anger and divine love are opposed to one another in the manner of contrary passions within the soul of man, or that God's hatred of sin excludes every form of His love toward the sinner who commits it.

The first principle to be remembered is that Almighty God, being infinitely perfect, simple, and immutable, is not subject to the succession of passions which belongs to created and mutable beings. When Scripture speaks of His wrath, His repentance, or His indignation, it signifies according to the manner of human expression certain effects of His eternal and unchangeable will, especially those by which He manifests justice against evil. It is therefore not strictly correct to imagine that God passes from love to anger as a man may become displeased with one whom he formerly regarded affectionately, nor that His anger arises from a disturbance of the divine tranquility. St. Thomas establishes this distinction in the First Part of the Summa, Question 20, where he explains that love belongs properly to the divine will, while the passions which accompany human love cannot be attributed to God according to their imperfect manner of existence. Divine justice and divine mercy proceed from the same eternal goodness; and what appears to creatures as the alternation of favor and punishment must not be mistaken for a change within God Himself.

It is particularly important that St. Thomas, in Article 2 of the same question, expressly maintains that God loves all existing things, since whatever possesses existence or goodness receives that perfection from the divine will. The sinner, although deprived through mortal sin of sanctifying grace and the friendship which accompanies it, does not cease to possess the natural goodness of the creature whom God has made. Thus God loves him according to his created nature and according to those goods which He continues to will for him, even while hating the moral disorder by which the sinner has turned away from his last end. The distinction is not difficult to understand when rightly expressed, since a father may sincerely love his son while detesting the crimes which the son has committed, and a physician may seek the patient's recovery while opposing with all his strength the disease which threatens to destroy him. Indeed, the opposition to the evil is often an expression of love for the good which the evil endangers.

Bullen's assertion that the Spirit is angry rather than loving can therefore be admitted only if it is understood in a restricted sense, namely that God does not regard unrepented wickedness with the complacency which belongs to holiness, nor does the sinner in mortal sin possess the supernatural friendship enjoyed by the just. But if the assertion is extended to signify that God ceases altogether to will the sinner's good, or that His judgment excludes every operation of benevolence toward the wicked, it becomes incompatible with the doctrine of divine providence and with the Gospel itself. For St. Paul declares that Christ died for sinners, and St. John teaches that God's love was manifested not because mankind had first loved Him, but because He loved us and sent His Son for our redemption. The initiative in salvation therefore belongs to divine charity, which calls the sinner before he has become righteous and moves him, through grace, toward the repentance by which he returns to God.

The example of Ananias and Sapphira cannot overturn this principle, for the judgment executed upon particular offenders demonstrates the reality of divine justice without establishing that mercy is absent from the divine nature. The same God who punishes sin calls sinners to repentance, and the same Christ who pronounced terrible judgments against hypocrisy wept over Jerusalem and offered Himself for the salvation of mankind. To infer from the punishment of one offense that the unrepentant are entitled to no manifestation of charity beyond warning is to draw a universal conclusion from a particular exercise of divine justice, while neglecting the numerous passages in which God's goodness is manifested toward those who have not yet returned to Him.

IV. Concerning the Intrinsic Dignity of Man, and Whether It May Be Destroyed Through Sin

Bullen's account of divine love is further complicated by his explanation of the relative value which God assigns to His creatures. He rightly maintains that man must not make his own temporal happiness the supreme measure of good and evil, and that the divine order possesses an excellence which cannot be subordinated to the private desires of an individual creature. He is likewise correct in distinguishing the dignity of human nature from the greater worth of holiness and righteousness, since no created good can possess an absolute claim against the justice of Almighty God. Nevertheless, in developing this argument he employs an analogy which becomes the occasion of a serious theological confusion. He compares a rebellious human being to an animal which, having become harmful to its master and his household, forfeits the usefulness for which it was retained; and from this example he reasons that the value originally possessed by the creature may be destroyed through its rebellion. The force of the comparison is evident, for the sinner is presented not merely as one who has lost moral rectitude or divine favor, but as a being whose intrinsic value may be extinguished by his opposition to the higher good.

Now there is an important truth which must be preserved even in this unfortunate comparison. By mortal sin a man does indeed lose sanctifying grace, charity, and the supernatural friendship of God, while his will becomes morally disordered and his actions may deserve punishment. St. Thomas himself, in Question 64, Article 2, speaks with considerable severity concerning the sinner's departure from the order of reason, and employs the comparison of a wicked man with an irrational beast in explaining why public authority may, under just conditions, impose capital punishment for the protection of the common good. It would therefore be inaccurate to suggest that every reference to the loss of dignity through sin is foreign to Catholic theology, or that the Angelic Doctor regards the moral condition of the just and the wicked as altogether equal. On the contrary, his doctrine plainly recognizes the terrible degradation produced by grave wrongdoing.

Yet the distinction which must not be overlooked is that the loss of moral rectitude is not the destruction of human nature, nor does the sinner become an irrational animal simply because his actions have departed from the rule of reason. The same St. Thomas who employs the severe analogy concerning the degradation caused by sin expressly teaches, in Question 25, Article 6, that human nature remains in the sinner and must consequently remain an object of charity. Likewise, in the First Part, Question 93, Article 4, he distinguishes the image of God which belongs to man's intellectual nature from the higher likeness acquired through grace and perfected in glory. The first remains in every human being, including the sinner; the second may be lost through mortal sin and restored by divine mercy. Thus the human person may suffer a profound moral and supernatural deprivation without ceasing to be a rational creature made in the image of God.

This distinction possesses consequences of the greatest importance for the exercise of justice. For although a criminal may, by his conduct, forfeit certain civil rights and become liable to punishment under legitimate authority, he does not thereby lose every claim arising from his nature as a human being. He remains subject to the judgment of God, capable during this life of repentance, and possessed of those natural rights which cannot be extinguished merely by the displeasure of another person. Even where the public authority lawfully imposes a severe penalty, the offender is not transformed into a creature outside the order of justice. He must still be judged according to his actual offense, the requirements of the common good, and the limits imposed by law and right reason.

Indeed, St. Thomas supplies a remarkable answer to the very inference suggested by Bullen's analogy. Having explained in Question 64, Article 2, why the wicked may sometimes be compared to beasts with respect to moral disorder, he asks in the following article whether a private individual may lawfully kill an evildoer. One of the objections expressly argues that because a sinful man is compared to a dangerous beast, and because private persons may kill dangerous beasts, it should likewise be lawful for private persons to put wicked men to death. Yet the Angelic Doctor rejects this conclusion, observing that the sinful man remains human by nature and that the authority to inflict punishment for the common good belongs to the public magistrate rather than to private persons. Thus the very scholastic distinction which Bullen's comparison requires prevents the comparison from being extended into an unrestricted principle of human worth or private coercive authority.

The Catholic position is consequently more exact than either sentimental humanism or an excessive severity which measures the dignity of persons solely by their present obedience. Human nature possesses a real and abiding goodness because it proceeds from God, while moral righteousness possesses a higher perfection because it orders that nature toward its proper end. The sinner may lose the second without ceasing to possess the first; and it is precisely because the first remains that the Christian must continue to desire his recovery of the second. Were the sinner truly deprived of every intrinsic good, the obligation to seek his conversion would lose its proper foundation, since there would remain no created nature to restore to supernatural friendship. But Catholic charity does not abandon the fallen man as though he had ceased to be a creature of God; it seeks his restoration because his nature, though wounded and disordered, remains capable of receiving grace.

V. Of Modesty, the Judgment of Exterior Conduct, and the Sin of Rashly Condemning Another's Heart

The same want of distinction appears, though in a different manner, in Bullen's treatment of Christian modesty. In Does Your Love Fulfill the Law?, he presents the example of a woman whose agreeable disposition and outward kindness are accompanied by dress which he describes as immodest and deliberately provocative; and from this he proceeds to characterize her inward condition in language suggesting the heart of a harlot, while regarding her outward friendliness as part of a deliberate effort to allure and deceive others. The object of the example is evidently to demonstrate that an agreeable temperament does not establish true righteousness, and that a person may appear gentle or charitable while remaining guilty of serious moral disorder. This general lesson is undoubtedly correct, since the virtue of modesty is not abolished by the presence of other agreeable qualities, nor does a pleasant disposition confer liberty to violate the obligations of chastity.

Catholic moral theology has always maintained that the outward conduct of Christians ought to correspond to the inward dignity of the soul and the duties of the state of life. St. Paul expressly commands modesty and sobriety in dress, and St. Thomas treats outward apparel as a matter subject to the regulation of reason, custom, intention, and the virtue of modesty. It would therefore be contrary to the Catholic tradition to maintain that clothing and public conduct are entirely indifferent, or that the deliberate cultivation of sensual temptation can never constitute a moral offense. Indeed, charity toward one's neighbor imposes the obligation to avoid conduct intended to provoke another's fall, while prudence requires that the circumstances of age, condition, place, and established custom be taken into account in judging whether particular dress is appropriate.

Nevertheless, from the fact that an outward action may be objectively immodest it does not immediately follow that the inward motives of the person performing it are known with certainty. A person may act through deliberate sensuality, vanity, ignorance, imprudence, conformity to custom, or some mixture of motives which only God can perfectly discern. The sinfulness of a particular choice may therefore be judged according to its outward character and sufficiently established circumstances, while the complete moral condition of the individual remains beyond the knowledge of those who observe it. St. Thomas discusses this distinction in Question 60 of the Second Part of the Second Part, where he explains that judgment must proceed from justice, legitimate authority, and prudence, and that rash judgment arises when a person forms a definite conclusion concerning doubtful or hidden matters without sufficient evidence.

It is important to acknowledge that Bullen's example expressly supposes a woman who insists upon displaying herself provocatively, so that the case is not simply one in which the observer draws every conclusion from clothing alone. Yet even where deliberate immodesty is established, it remains necessary to distinguish the particular wrongful intention demonstrated by the circumstances from an unrestricted judgment concerning the whole character of the soul. A person who commits a grave sin deserves correction concerning that sin; but the Christian who corrects her does not thereby obtain knowledge of every concealed disposition, nor authority to describe her entire spiritual condition according to the utmost severity which his imagination can supply. The obligation to judge conduct rightly does not dispense us from the separate obligation to judge persons cautiously.

The ancient moral theology is especially careful upon this point, because rash judgment is itself an offense against charity and, in certain circumstances, against justice. St. Thomas distinguishes the first movement of suspicion from the deliberate acceptance of a serious accusation as certain, and teaches that the gravity of the sin increases when another's wickedness is confidently affirmed upon insufficient grounds. The Christian who is zealous to correct immodesty must therefore be equally zealous to avoid pride, contempt, and the presumption of possessing a knowledge of hearts which belongs to God alone. Otherwise he may condemn a genuine offense while committing another in the very act of correction, and may suppose himself to be defending righteousness when he has merely exchanged one form of disorder for another.

Here the doctrine of St. Francis de Sales is especially worthy of remembrance, for his treatment of gentleness, patience, and the judgment of one's neighbor proceeds from the conviction that true devotion must unite firmness against sin with humility concerning oneself. The necessity of correction is not denied, but the manner in which it is administered must be governed by the good of the person corrected and by the virtues which the corrector himself is bound to practice. The Christian may therefore speak plainly, and at times severely, concerning an established offense; yet he must not make severity an end in itself, nor imagine that the harshness of his expressions is a sufficient proof of their righteousness.

VI. That Fraternal Correction Is an Act of Charity, but Cannot Be Substituted for Every Other Work of Mercy

It must be freely acknowledged that Bullen's insistence upon the duty of correcting sinners has considerable scriptural foundation. The prophet Ezechiel speaks of the grave responsibility resting upon the watchman who fails to warn the wicked of impending danger, while the Apostle commands that those who persist in wrongdoing should be admonished according to the order of Christian discipline. Our Lord likewise instructs His disciples concerning the correction of an offending brother, and St. Paul repeatedly demonstrates that pastoral charity may require stern rebuke when false doctrine or immoral conduct threatens the salvation of souls. The Catholic Church has never understood charity as a prohibition against correction, nor has she taught that every painful admonition is contrary to gentleness. Indeed, the spiritual works of mercy include the admonition of sinners, the instruction of the ignorant, and the counsel of the doubtful, because the spiritual welfare of our neighbor possesses an excellence greater than his merely temporal comfort.

Nevertheless, to recognize admonition as a work of charity is not to establish that admonition comprehends the entirety of charity. St. Thomas, in Question 33, Article 1, expressly identifies fraternal correction as a charitable remedy directed toward the amendment of the sinner, and explains that the removal of another's spiritual evil is an act of benevolence because it seeks the good of the person afflicted. Yet the Angelic Doctor treats this question within a much broader discussion of the acts of charity, mercy, and beneficence, in which the relief of bodily suffering, the assistance of those in necessity, and the various duties of Christian friendship possess their own proper place. The correction of sinners is therefore one species of charitable action, distinguished from other works by the particular evil which it seeks to remedy. It cannot be made the sole form of love owed to the unrighteous without denying that their other necessities remain capable of becoming occasions for Christian mercy.

This distinction may be understood from the very different circumstances in which a sinner may be encountered. If a man obstinately teaches false doctrine, charity may require that his error be publicly contradicted, especially where the faith of others is endangered. If the same man is afterward found wounded and in danger of death, charity may require that he be rescued and tended, without any obligation to suspend necessary assistance until he has first renounced his error. If he is hungry, charity may oblige one who possesses sufficient means to relieve his want; and if he seeks instruction concerning the truth, charity may require patient teaching rather than the immediate repetition of threats. The duty in each case arises from the actual necessity of the person, the responsibility of the Christian who encounters him, and the prudent judgment of what will truly promote his good. Thus it is possible to condemn the error, oppose the wrongdoing, and assist the wrongdoer, without contradiction or compromise.

Our Lord's own conduct supplies the most perfect example. He rebuked the Pharisees with terrible severity, yet He also received sinners, healed the afflicted, fed the multitude, and wept over those who refused His grace. The woman taken in adultery was not told that her sin was insignificant, but neither was she treated as a creature beyond the reach of mercy. The publican was called to repentance, yet the divine Physician approached him while he remained in need of healing. These several actions were not different and conflicting forms of love, but manifestations of the same divine charity adapted with perfect wisdom to the condition of those who received them. Consequently, whoever seeks to imitate Christ must imitate not merely His condemnations, but His patience, gentleness, beneficence, and compassion; for to select only those acts which correspond to one's own inclination toward severity is not to reproduce the fullness of His moral example.

Moreover, the duty of correction itself is subject to prudence. St. Thomas teaches that the circumstances, manner, and probable consequences of an admonition must be considered, and that a correction which would manifestly occasion greater evil may sometimes be postponed or modified. Such prudence does not arise from cowardice or indifference toward sin, but from the nature of charity, which seeks the amendment of the offender rather than the satisfaction of the corrector's indignation. The Apostle accordingly commands that those overtaken in a fault should be restored in a spirit of meekness, while each should consider his own weakness lest he also be tempted. Thus even the act by which evil is condemned must itself remain subject to the virtues of humility, patience, and charity, without which zeal for righteousness may become an occasion of spiritual pride.

VII. Concerning Human Responsibility, the Observance of God's Commandments, and the Necessity of Divine Grace

A related difficulty appears in Bullen's discussion of human responsibility, wherein he argues that God will not condemn a man for failing to comprehend the mysteries of divine foreknowledge and predestination, but will condemn him for failing to obey those commandments which God has plainly revealed. He adds that the commands of Scripture may be understood and obeyed by all, and employs this principle against the Calvinistic doctrine of unconditional eternal security. The general intention of the argument is commendable, for the Catholic Church equally rejects the assertion that the mysteries of predestination render human obedience unnecessary, and she teaches that man remains genuinely responsible for the free actions by which he obeys or violates the divine law. Indeed, the Council of Trent solemnly condemns both the denial of man's free cooperation with grace and the assertion that the commandments of God are impossible for those who have been justified and strengthened by divine assistance.

Yet the doctrine of responsibility cannot be rightly understood without the prior doctrine of grace, since the fall of Adam has left human nature wounded, and the supernatural end to which man is called exceeds the powers of unaided nature. The ability to recognize that an action is commanded by God does not of itself establish that fallen man possesses, independently of divine assistance, the spiritual strength to fulfill that commandment in a manner proportioned to eternal life. Nor does the fact that God requires repentance prove that repentance can begin through the unaided effort of the sinner, as though divine grace were merely a reward bestowed after man had sufficiently humbled himself. The distinction is particularly important because Bullen elsewhere speaks of persons becoming eligible for God's grace through humility and sincere efforts at obedience, language which may be understood innocently if it presupposes prevenient grace, but which would become doctrinally erroneous if it placed the first movement toward salvation wholly within man's natural powers.

The Second Council of Orange, held in the year 529, expressly addressed errors of this character, teaching that the good movements by which man believes, seeks, prays, and humbles himself before God are not independent achievements which precede every operation of grace, but are themselves made possible through the divine assistance. Canon 6 particularly rejects the assertion that the assistance of grace depends upon man's humility or obedience in such a manner that these dispositions are first produced without grace. The Council of Trent later confirmed the necessity of prevenient grace in its decree concerning justification, while preserving the reality of man's cooperation with the divine motion. Thus Catholic doctrine avoids the two opposite extremes of treating the human will as a passive instrument incapable of free cooperation, and of attributing to that same will a supernatural sufficiency which it does not possess by nature.

In Chapter 11 of the decree on justification, Trent teaches that God does not command impossibilities, but admonishes man to do what he can, to ask for what he cannot, and supplies His help so that he may become able. These words express with singular precision the relation between responsibility and grace. The commandments are real, and their observance is obligatory; yet their supernatural fulfillment is possible because God does not abandon those whom He calls, but assists them through the grace of Christ. It is therefore insufficient to defend human responsibility by insisting merely that everyone can obey, unless the nature of that ability and the assistance by which it is exercised are rightly understood. The sinner must repent, but grace moves him toward repentance; the Christian must persevere, but grace sustains him in perseverance; and the obligation of obedience, far from excluding the necessity of prayer, makes that necessity more evident.

Bullen's proposition concerning the responsibility of those who receive God's commandments should therefore not be condemned as though it expressly denied grace, since his surrounding discussion acknowledges divine foreknowledge, election, and other operations of God, and the broader source does not conclusively establish that he intends unaided natural sufficiency. Nevertheless, his manner of reasoning requires an important theological correction. Divine grace must not be represented as though it merely ratified an obedience already made possible by man's independent strength, for even the beginnings of salutary obedience are gifts of God. The Catholic doctrine preserves the full seriousness of the divine commandments while humbling the believer under the knowledge that whatever supernatural good he accomplishes is accomplished through grace, which precedes, accompanies, and perfects the cooperation of his free will.

VIII. Of the Prayer of Christ, and Why His Example Must Not Be Understood as Evidence of Imperfection

The question of grace and human weakness also supplies the proper setting for a statement found in his writing, Young Elijahs, where the necessity of prayer is illustrated by the example of Our Lord withdrawing from the multitude to pray. The author asks, in effect, why Christians imagine themselves capable of proceeding without prayer when Jesus Himself regarded prayer as necessary, and from this example urges the faithful to recognize their continual dependence upon God. The practical exhortation is altogether suitable, for the Gospels frequently record the prayer of Christ, and the Christian who neglects prayer deprives himself of one of the principal means by which divine assistance is sought and received. Yet the expression that Jesus could not continue without prayer requires a distinction, lest the ordinary weakness of fallen mankind be improperly attributed to the Incarnate Son of God.

St. Thomas examines this question in the Third Part of the Summa, Question 21, Article 1, where he explains that prayer belongs to Christ according to His true human nature and human will, while carefully excluding the supposition that He prayed because of an imperfection incompatible with His divine Person. Christ possessed a complete human nature and exercised the human acts proper to that nature, yet His humanity was united hypostatically to the eternal Word and enjoyed a fullness of grace entirely unlike the condition of fallen men. He did not pray because He was liable to moral failure through a defect of grace, nor because the divine power upon which His humanity depended was uncertain or insufficient. Rather, His prayer manifested the proper order of His human will toward the Father, supplied an example for His disciples, and belonged to the perfect exercise of His human obedience.

The distinction is important because an exhortation may be practically useful while remaining theologically imprecise. To say that Christ prayed and that Christians must imitate Him is unquestionably true; to suggest that He required prayer in order to overcome an inward possibility of sinful failure would attribute to Him a condition contrary to His perfect holiness. We should therefore receive the legitimate moral lesson while refusing any implication inconsistent with the doctrine of the Incarnation. The weakness of ordinary Christians establishes their need of grace through prayer, whereas the prayer of Christ manifests the perfection of His human obedience and the example by which He teaches us to seek the Father's will.

IX. Whether a Christian May Lawfully Resist Violence, and Why Absolute Pacifism Is Not the Doctrine of the Catholic Church

We come now to that portion of Bullen's moral teaching which concerns the use of force in defense of oneself or another, a question upon which he has written at considerable length in his work entitled Resist Not Evil???. His principal adversary in this controversy is the pacifist interpretation historically associated with certain Anabaptist communities, according to which the command of Our Lord not to resist evil is understood as excluding the Christian from the deliberate employment of violent force, even in circumstances where the innocent are unjustly attacked. Against this position Bullen argues that the authority of the magistrate, the legitimate defense of human life, and the obligation to protect the weak are established by divine law, and that the New Testament must not be interpreted as though Christ had condemned the righteous exercise of authority which God Himself had formerly ordained.

In opposing the assertion that every defensive use of force is intrinsically sinful, Bullen has placed himself upon ground which Catholic theology likewise maintains. The Church has never taught that a Christian must necessarily permit himself or those entrusted to his care to be murdered rather than employ moderate and lawful means of defense. Neither has she regarded the offices of soldier, magistrate, or guardian of public order as necessarily incompatible with the Christian profession. St. Paul, in Romans 13, expressly recognizes the civil authority as a minister of God charged with maintaining justice and restraining wrongdoing, while St. Augustine, in The City of God, and St. Thomas Aquinas, in the Second Part of the Second Part of the Summa, recognize that the legitimate use of force may be required for the protection of the community. The absolute pacifist conclusion that the Christian may never employ force against an unjust aggressor is therefore not the teaching of the Catholic Church.

Nevertheless, it would be a grave mistake to suppose that the rejection of absolute pacifism establishes an unrestricted liberty of violent resistance. For the moral law which permits defense also determines the conditions under which it may be exercised, and the preservation of the innocent does not authorize every means which a defender might judge expedient. The same St. Thomas who expressly defends the lawfulness of moderate self-defense carefully distinguishes the act of defending life from the intentional killing of an aggressor, and likewise distinguishes the authority of the private person from the jurisdiction of the magistrate. These distinctions are not incidental qualifications which may be omitted without altering the doctrine; they constitute the very principles by which an act of defense is separated from an act of unjust violence.

The Catholic explanation therefore proceeds neither from the pacifist assertion that all resistance is forbidden, nor from the contrary assumption that all resistance undertaken for a righteous cause must be lawful. Rather, it asks whether the resistance is exercised by a person possessing the appropriate right or authority, whether the danger is real and sufficiently grave, whether the means are necessary and proportionate, whether the act proceeds from an intention ordered toward legitimate defense, and whether the force employed remains within the limits established by justice and prudence. Without these distinctions, the doctrine of self-defense may become a pretext under which punishment, vengeance, and the excessive use of force are mistakenly justified as though they were merely consequences of the aggressor's wrongdoing.

X. Of the Thomistic Distinction Between Defending Life and Intending the Death of an Aggressor

The decisive theological authority for this question is St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, Question 64, Article 7, wherein he expressly asks whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense. His answer is distinguished by a precision which avoids both the severity of absolute nonresistance and the excesses of a doctrine that would justify lethal violence merely because the person against whom it is directed has committed an injustice. The Angelic Doctor begins by observing that a single human action may possess two effects, of which one is intended by the agent while the other occurs beside his intention. In the case of self-defense, the preservation of the defender's life may constitute the intended effect, while the death of the aggressor may occur as another effect of the same defensive act. The moral character of the action must therefore be judged according to the object and intention of the defender, together with the proportion which the means employed bear to the legitimate end.

This distinction possesses the greatest importance, for it demonstrates that the death of an aggressor is not automatically murder merely because it results from an action deliberately undertaken by another person; yet neither does the righteousness of the defender's general purpose automatically excuse every means chosen to accomplish it. St. Thomas expressly teaches that excessive violence renders self-defense unlawful, even though the defender's intention may originally have been the preservation of his own life. The legitimacy of resistance therefore depends not merely upon the injustice of the assault, but upon the moderation with which that assault is repelled. A man does not acquire unrestricted power over another's life merely because the other has become an aggressor, nor does the aggressor's culpability remove the defender's obligation to act according to the measure of reason.

Bullen, in Resist Not Evil???, printed page 100, declares that if he should kill a criminal while attempting to defend his own life or protect the weak, he would nevertheless be acting within his God-ordained role, and that responsibility for the resulting death would rest upon the aggressor himself. The immediate context makes clear that he is opposing those who regard every lethal consequence of self-defense as necessarily sinful, and in this respect his position may be reconciled with the doctrine of St. Thomas. The expression that he might end up killing an aggressor may indeed signify that death is an unintended consequence of an otherwise lawful defensive action. It would therefore be unjust to conclude, from his proposition alone, that he necessarily approves the deliberate killing of an aggressor by every private defender.

Nevertheless, the language employed requires substantial qualification, and its danger becomes more apparent when placed beside Bullen's broader arguments concerning divine commands, the execution of criminals, and the obligations of the righteous toward evildoers. For the assertion that responsibility for the aggressor's death rests upon his own head is not an adequate moral principle unless the defender's conduct has itself remained within the limits of justice. The aggressor may bear responsibility for initiating the unlawful assault, while the defender may nevertheless incur responsibility for employing force greater than the danger required, for continuing violence after the danger has ceased, or for acting from revenge rather than from the legitimate desire to protect life. The original injustice of one person does not make every subsequent action of the other person innocent.

Consider the difference between repelling an immediate threat against life and inflicting grave harm upon a person whose unlawful conduct no longer presents such a threat. In the first case, the defender may lawfully use such force as is reasonably necessary to preserve the innocent; in the second, the justification of immediate defense no longer applies merely because the person concerned has previously committed a crime. Likewise, the protection of human life possesses a moral gravity which cannot simply be transferred without distinction to the protection of property or the punishment of an offense already completed. The judgment of what force is permissible must therefore consider the nature and immediacy of the threat, the means reasonably available, and the proportionality of the response. It is not sufficient to say that the aggressor was a criminal, since criminal wrongdoing does not by itself confer upon a private individual the authority to inflict death.

The distinction between intention and effect must likewise be preserved in its full theological meaning. The defender may foresee that the lawful force necessary to repel an unjust attack could result in the death of the aggressor without choosing that death as the object or means of his action. But the defender cannot convert an intended killing into an unintended effect merely by declaring that his ultimate purpose was good. A good intention does not make an intrinsically disordered means lawful, nor may an evil means be justified simply because the desired outcome is the preservation of another person's life. In the Thomistic account, the morally permissible act must itself be ordered toward defense, while the evil consequence must remain outside the defender's intention and the force employed must not exceed what the circumstances reasonably require. This is the foundation of the traditional distinction commonly explained through the doctrine of the twofold effect.

Bullen's defense of resistance against pacifism is therefore materially correct only to the extent that it is governed by these additional principles. The Christian is not forbidden to preserve his own life, and may possess a serious duty to protect those placed under his care; nevertheless, the fact that he acts in pursuit of a legitimate end does not release him from the obligations of moderation, justice, and charity. Indeed, the more grave the consequences of an act of resistance may be, the more carefully its moral character must be examined, since the destruction of human life is an evil which cannot be treated as a matter of indifference merely because it occurs in the course of opposing another evil.

XI. Whether the Duty to Protect the Weak Imposes an Unqualified Obligation to Employ Force

Bullen further maintains that God has commanded him to protect the weak and that it would be sinful to fail in this obligation. The principle expressed is noble when rightly understood, since the moral law certainly requires those who possess the appropriate power, responsibility, and opportunity to assist the innocent against unjust injury. Parents are obliged to care for their children, public authorities are entrusted with the protection of those subject to their government, and the common duties of charity may require private persons to render assistance when another is exposed to grave danger. The Catholic tradition has never treated the preservation of innocent life as a matter of indifference, nor has it regarded the deliberate abandonment of persons entrusted to one's care as an exercise of superior Christian perfection.

Nevertheless, the obligation must be understood according to the distinctions proper to every affirmative precept of the moral law. A command to assist another does not bind every person to undertake every conceivable means of assistance, without regard to the possibility of success, the gravity of the danger, the duties owed to other persons, or the proportion between the good to be obtained and the harm which may reasonably be expected. The duty of charity is real, but its application requires prudence; and the right to protect another from violence does not automatically authorize the employment of a force which exceeds the necessity of the situation. A person who cannot intervene effectively through physical resistance may nevertheless fulfill his obligation through other lawful forms of assistance, while one who possesses a particular office or responsibility may be bound to undertake dangers which an ordinary bystander is not required to assume.

Nor should the voluntary acceptance of suffering be dismissed as though it were necessarily contrary to the duty of self-preservation. St. Thomas himself teaches that a man is not obliged to omit moderate self-defense merely to avoid the aggressor's death, but this does not signify that every act of voluntary nonresistance is therefore sinful. The Christian may sometimes renounce his own legitimate claims or endure personal injury for a higher spiritual good, provided that he does not thereby neglect duties which justice imposes toward others. Our Lord's teaching concerning the turning of the other cheek concerns precisely the dispositions by which personal vengeance is overcome, and cannot rightly be transformed either into an absolute prohibition of every defensive action or into a principle that personal forbearance is always an evasion of moral responsibility.

The defense of the weak must therefore be governed by the same moral principles which determine the legitimacy of all other human actions. Good ends do not sanctify evil means, and the protection of innocence cannot be separated from the obligation to respect justice in the manner of protecting it. The Christian who acts with genuine charity seeks to preserve the victim while avoiding unnecessary harm to the aggressor, not because he regards the aggressor's wrongdoing as insignificant, but because the aggressor remains a human person whose life is not placed at the unrestricted disposal of the defender. Such restraint is not weakness, nor does it imply sympathy with injustice; it is the practical expression of a moral law which remains binding upon the righteous no less than upon the wicked.

XII. Of the Harmony Between Justice and Mercy, and Why Neither Can Be Perfected by the Destruction of the Other

We may now perceive the common theological difficulty underlying Bullen's treatment of charity, human dignity, and the legitimate use of force. In each case he begins with a genuine moral truth which he endeavors to preserve against an opposing error. Against sentimental permissiveness he defends the necessity of obedience; against an indulgent attitude toward wrongdoing he insists upon the reality of divine judgment; against the denial of moral responsibility he maintains the freedom and accountability of the human will; and against absolute pacifism he vindicates the duty of protecting the innocent. Yet in developing these truths he repeatedly approaches the opposite extreme, as though the rejection of one error sufficiently established the correctness of every assertion made in opposition to it. Thus the reality of divine wrath becomes the occasion of restricting divine love, the sinfulness of human rebellion becomes the occasion of questioning intrinsic human worth, and the legitimacy of resistance becomes the occasion of employing language which does not adequately preserve the conditions governing defensive force.

The method of Catholic theology is altogether different, for it does not attempt to preserve one divine truth by diminishing another, but seeks their proper distinction and harmonious order. Justice and mercy are not contrary perfections between which the Christian must choose, nor are the obligations of charity suspended whenever a person becomes deserving of punishment. St. Thomas, in Question 30 of the Second Part of the Second Part, explains that mercy is a virtue by which the misery of another becomes the occasion of compassionate assistance, and that such mercy must be governed by reason so that justice is not violated. Far from being an infirmity opposed to righteousness, mercy is a perfection which manifests the goodness of God and which, among the virtues concerned with our neighbor, possesses a singular excellence. The merciful man does not call evil good, nor does the just man cease to be merciful because he condemns evil; rather, both virtues are ordered toward the true good of the person and of the community.

This principle is especially evident in the distinction between the hatred of sin and the love of the sinner. The former is necessary because sin is a privation of the order which God wills; the latter is necessary because the sinner remains a creature capable of participating in that order through grace. Correction is charitable because it seeks the removal of sin; punishment may be just because it protects the common good; and mercy is virtuous because it relieves misery without approving wrongdoing. These several acts differ in their immediate objects and in the circumstances governing their exercise, yet they may proceed from one and the same supernatural charity. Their unity does not require that they always be exercised in the same manner or with equal severity, but that each remain subject to the end toward which Christian morality is directed, namely the glory of God and the salvation of souls.

The Catholic doctrine also preserves the distinction between the divine authority to judge the inward state of man and the limited authority granted to creatures to judge his outward actions. God sees the heart and renders infallible judgment concerning the moral condition of every person; man judges according to the evidence which he possesses and according to the jurisdiction committed to him. A Christian may therefore denounce an objectively evil action with certainty while refraining from presuming that he knows the entire interior state of the person who performs it. Likewise, a magistrate may impose a just penalty within the limits of his office without possessing the divine prerogative of determining the final spiritual destiny of the offender. These distinctions preserve humility in those who govern, charity in those who correct, and moderation in those who resist injustice.

It is therefore insufficient to define Christian righteousness merely by the willingness to oppose evil, since the virtues required for opposing it are themselves part of the righteousness which must be preserved. A man may defend a true doctrine and nevertheless sin through pride; he may rebuke a genuine offense and nevertheless sin through rash judgment; he may lawfully undertake the defense of another and nevertheless sin through excessive violence; and he may rightly affirm the justice of divine punishment while wrongly denying the continuing goodness of the human nature upon which that punishment is inflicted. The correctness of the object defended does not dispense with the righteousness of the means employed in defending it. On the contrary, the more precious the truth, the greater the obligation that it should be defended in a manner worthy of its divine origin.

Conclusion: That the Perfection of Christian Morality Consists Neither in Indulgence Toward Evil Nor in Severity Toward the Sinner, but in the Rightly Ordered Exercise of Every Virtue

We have therefore found that the principal defects of Bullen's moral theology arise not from an excessive reverence for the commandments of God, nor from a mistaken conviction that Christians ought to oppose wrongdoing, but from the manner in which certain true principles are carried beyond the distinctions necessary for their proper application. His rejection of a sentimental charity which excuses sin is substantially correct, yet his restriction of the love owed to the impenitent sinner is incompatible with the fuller doctrine of Christian benevolence. His insistence upon the righteousness of divine judgment is likewise justified, yet his opposition between divine wrath and divine love obscures the distinction between the sinner's guilt and his continuing created goodness. His recognition that rebellion diminishes man's moral dignity is not without foundation in the language of the scholastic Doctors, yet his comparison of the sinner's intrinsic worth with that of a rebellious animal fails to preserve the enduring image of God and the natural dignity which mortal sin does not destroy.

In like manner, his opposition to absolute pacifism expresses a truth which Catholic theology has always maintained, since the divine law does not forbid every use of force in the protection of life, nor does the Christian profession exclude the legitimate exercise of civil authority. Nevertheless, the righteousness of self-defense cannot be established merely by the wickedness of the aggressor or by the goodness of the end which the defender desires to accomplish. The Angelic Doctor requires that the defensive act be distinguished from the intentional taking of life, that the force employed remain proportionate to the danger, and that the authority of private persons be carefully separated from the jurisdiction entrusted to public magistrates. These qualifications are not concessions to pacifism, but expressions of the moral law itself, which forbids injustice even when the person against whom it is committed has already acted unjustly.

The same principle governs fraternal correction, the judgment of others, and the performance of works of mercy. The Christian is obliged to rebuke sin when charity and prudence require it, but he is not thereby authorized to presume knowledge of another's heart, to despise the dignity of the sinner, or to withhold those acts of compassion which the Gospel commands. For the divine law does not consist in the cultivation of severity as though severity were itself a virtue, but in the rightly ordered exercise of every virtue according to its proper object and end. Justice requires that evil be condemned and wrongdoing restrained; charity requires that the good of the sinner be sincerely desired; mercy requires that his misery be relieved when prudence and justice permit; and humility requires that the corrector remember his own dependence upon the grace of God.

It is therefore a false opposition to suppose that the Christian must choose between fidelity to righteousness and compassion toward the unrighteous, since the same God who commands the hatred of sin commands the love of enemies, and the same Redeemer who rebuked the impenitent gave His life for the salvation of sinners. Nor may the severity of particular divine judgments be employed to diminish the universal obligation of charity, for the judgments of God proceed from His infinite wisdom, whereas the actions of men remain subject to the limitations of their knowledge, their authority, and their imperfect virtue. The human minister of righteousness must consequently imitate not merely the outward severity of certain divine acts, but also the patience, justice, prudence, and mercy with which Almighty God governs His creatures.

St. Thomas Aquinas has supplied the most admirable resolution of these difficulties, since he neither excuses sin for the sake of the sinner nor despises the sinner because of his sin; neither forbids all resistance to injustice nor permits resistance without the limits of justice; neither denies the authority of the magistrate nor confounds that authority with the rights of private persons. His theology preserves the order of nature and grace, the distinction between inward guilt and outward conduct, and the harmony of those virtues which together constitute the perfection of Christian life. In this respect the Catholic doctrine proves itself more complete than the contrary extremes which it rejects, for it does not establish one truth by sacrificing another, but assigns to each its proper place within the divine order.

Let us therefore never imagine that charity is perfected by becoming indifferent to sin, nor that righteousness is rendered more excellent by the abandonment of mercy. The Christian must hate every offense against Almighty God, but he must do so with a heart which sincerely desires the conversion of the offender; he must oppose injustice, but without becoming unjust in the manner of opposing it; he must defend the innocent, but without forgetting that even the aggressor remains accountable to a law which protects him from unnecessary harm. And when he is called to correct another, let him remember that he himself stands only through the assistance of divine grace, without which neither his zeal nor his obedience could possess the supernatural perfection required for eternal life.

For the final measure of Christian virtue is not the indignation with which a man condemns his neighbor, nor the boldness with which he declares himself the defender of God's law, but the conformity of his whole life to the divine charity which animates and perfects that law. He who truly loves God will not approve what God condemns; yet neither will he refuse to love those whom God commands him to love. Thus the righteousness of the Gospel is preserved, not by diminishing charity in the name of justice, nor by diminishing justice in the name of charity, but by recognizing that both proceed from the eternal goodness of the same Lord.

And therefore the Apostle, having instructed the faithful concerning the treatment of their enemies and the conquest of evil, concludes with those words which perfectly express the Christian's obligation:

"Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good."


Principal Theological Authorities

Sacred Scripture: Genesis 1:26–27; Leviticus 19:17–18; Matthew 5:38–48; Matthew 7:1–5; Matthew 9:9–13; Matthew 18:15–17; Matthew 22:36–40; Matthew 25:31–46; Luke 6:27–36; Luke 10:25–37; Luke 15; Romans 5:6–8; Romans 12:9–21; Romans 13:1–10; 1 Corinthians 13; Galatians 5:13–23; Galatians 6:1–10; James 2:13–17; 1 John 4:7–21.

St. Augustine: The City of God, Books I and IX; On Christian Doctrine, Book I; On Grace and Free Will; On the Sermon on the Mount.

St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, I, Question 20, Articles 1–4 (Divine Love); I, Question 93, Article 4 (The Image of God in Every Man); II–II, Question 25, Articles 6–9 (Charity Toward Sinners and Enemies); II–II, Questions 30–33 (Mercy, Beneficence, Almsgiving, and Fraternal Correction); II–II, Question 60, Articles 2–3 (Judgment and Suspicion); II–II, Question 64, Articles 2–3 and 7 (Punishment, Public Authority, and Self-Defense); II–II, Question 169 (Modesty in Outward Apparel); III, Question 21 (The Prayer of Christ).

St. Francis de Sales: Introduction to the Devout Life, Part III, particularly the discussions of gentleness, patience, and rash judgment.

The Second Council of Orange (529): Especially Canons 6–8 concerning divine grace and the beginning of salutary acts.

The Council of Trent: Session VI, Decree on Justification, particularly Chapter 11 and Canons 1–5, 18, and 22, concerning grace, free will, and the observance of the commandments.

The Roman Catechism: Part IV, concerning the Third Petition of the Lord's Prayer and man's dependence upon divine grace.

Primary Sources

Mark Bullen, Does [Your] Love Fulfill the Law?: pages 5–9.

Mark Bullen, Resist Not Evil???: page 100, Chapter 9, concerning the use of force in self-defense and the protection of the weak.

Mark Bullen, Apostolic Faith & Biblical Christian Living: page 44, in the discussion of biblical salvation and the controversy between synergism and monergism.

Mark Bullen, The Faith Once Delivered Website: Young Elijahs, Chapter 15, concerning the necessity of prayer and the example of Our Lord.